This study examines the determinants of fiscal slack from the perspective of Chinese local government officials. Given China's rapid economic growth over the past 30-plus years, Chinese local governments reportedly hold huge slack resources that attract public scrutiny. In an effort to improve their fiscal performance, some localities recently established budget stabilization funds, following a top-down initiative. However, it remains unclear to what extent fiscal slack has accumulated and which factors affect slack resource levels of Chinese local governments. By employing a panel dataset (249 prefecture-level cities, 1999-2009), this study finds that political and fiscal factors exert significant influence over local officials' decisions about slack resource levels. The findings of the study bear implications for establishing fiscal rules and improving the performance of sub-national governments in China and other countries.
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INTRODUCTION
With the country's rapid economic growth over the past three decades, Chinese local governments have often reportedly shown significant fiscal slack, or unspent budgetary funds at the end of a fiscal year, which has attracted great public scrutiny in recent years.
1 Local governments in China are frequently plagued by the unexpected problem of delays in spending and the accumulation of significant year-end fiscal balances (Ma and Yu 2012) . On the one hand, these slack resources suggest that Chinese local governments are generally situated in a strong fiscal position with abundant resources to tap into when dealing with emergencies such as the Great Recession. On the other hand, huge amounts of unused resources cause concerns over government operational efficiency and inadequate capacity in budget implementation. The public and the research community have therefore begun to question why these governments do not spend their resources as budgeted (Ma and Yu 2012) .
2
Since 1994 China has used a highly centralized revenue system and fairly decentralized expenditure assignments to local governments; thus far, the country has not fully adopted open, democratic mechanisms for budgetary decision making or for the oversight of budget execution.
In this financial administrative structure, local governments in China face distinctive political and fiscal incentives related to fiscal operations from their counterparts in Western countries. In addition, Chinese local governments' fiscal behavior, reform strategies, and outcomes are mainly determined by China's political and economic institutions (Xu 2011) . Based on the foregoing, this study investigates the role of local governments in financial administration in the Chinese governance structure.
Scholars generally agree that the quality of political and economic institutions is important for reform and development, because it determines the incentives for government 2 officials and all the players in an economy. Standard theory would suggest that, under poor institutions in consequence of a lack of democratic accountability and an absence of the rule of law, Chinese officials would not commit to promoting reform and development. However, the sharp contrast between China's "poor" institutions and its remarkable performance 3 poses serious challenges to our general understanding of the mechanics of these institutions. Without a thorough understanding of the working mechanisms of institutions in developing countries, China's performance becomes inexplicable (Xu 2011).
Numerous studies have attempted to explain China's incredible performance in reform and development since 1978. Nevertheless, none of them has examined what factors affect the level of the year-end balances experienced by Chinese local governments. As the frontline body in the provision of public services, local governments ideally should uphold the policy inclination to act countercyclically to stabilize their budgets, or service provisions, because recessions are the exact time when local residents rely on basic public services to be steadfast so that they can overcome financial and employment hardships (Hou 2010) . As observed by Dothan et al. (2013) , the provision of stability is central to government purpose, with the management of risk and uncertainty as its basic function; thus, the goal of government budget process is stability.
In the United States, the "adoption, maintenance, and prudent use of budgetary stabilization funds have become fundamental precepts of municipal financial management" (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015, p.304) . In China, the effort to establish an institutionalized fiscal reserve system for sub-national governments began fairly recently. To improve fiscal performance, following an initiative of the central government in 2007 some province-level governments began to establish budget stabilization funds, and sub-provincial governments may follow suit. 4 Only in recent years have scholars begun to investigate the management of fiscal slack in local 3 governments. There is a growing body of literature on this topic, but the variables that influence the size of financial reserves are poorly understood (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015) . Two decades after the overhaul of its fiscal system in 1994, China has finally set a timetable to finish major fiscal and tax reform tasks by 2016, and to establish a modern fiscal system by 2020 (China Daily 2014). Thus, this study not only fills a niche in the literature, but also offers timely and important practical implications. The remainder of the paper is organized into six sections. The next section reviews existing literature on the determinants of local government fiscal slack in both Western countries and China. Section Three discusses the effects of political and fiscal incentives on local fiscal slack in China and presents hypotheses for empirical testing. Section Four presents model, data, and methodology, followed by a discussion of the study's empirical results in Section Five. The final section offers conclusions and recommendations.
DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL FISCAL SLACK
State and local governments in the United States accumulate fiscal slack via either formal "rainy day funds" or informal means such as year-end balances of the general fund, other governmental funds, and enterprise funds (Wang and Hou 2012) . Local governments do not use rainy day funds as widely as state governments (Hou 2008) ; instead, they primarily rely on fund balances as a buffer against natural disasters and revenue shortfalls to help stabilize tax and fee rates as well as public service levels (Coe 2007; Marlowe 2005; Shelton and Tyer 2000 There is a small, but growing, body of literature regarding the factors that affect the size of the fund balances of local governments in the United States. This literature is in its early stages (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015) and still needs to "develop a theoretical model that incorporates relevant managerial, organizational, and political features" (Hendrick 2006, p.43 Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) find that variations in stabilization fund balances can be explained by a community's political culture and financial management capacity.
Communities with stronger anti-tax and pro-spending sentiments are found to have lower stabilization fund balances. For voters with an anti-tax political disposition, balances represent unnecessary taxation, whereas these balances stand for foregone spending for voters who possess a pro-spending political disposition. Stronger financial management capacity also contributes to maintaining higher stabilization fund balances. Gore (2009) shows that a higher variation in revenues, more limited revenue sources, and higher population growth in municipalities are associated with higher levels of cash balances.
Municipalities with high cash levels, or excess cash, spend substantially more on administrative expenses, manager salaries, and bonuses, but there is no evidence that excess cash is used to lower tax rates. The findings raise the potential ethical dilemma of professional financial managers possibly pursuing their own savings agenda that benefits themselves at the expense of citizens. Therefore, while slack resources, such as rainy day funds, can provide a cushion against revenue fluctuations, in the extreme they may be associated with agency problems between 7 municipal managers and citizens. Similarly, local government officials in China may be subject to the same agency problems; they are likely under certain circumstances to make decisions about slack resources in order to advance their personal benefits.
Only two studies relevant to local fiscal balances in China are found in the literature. Ma and Yu (2012) Echoing this study, Deng and Peng (2011) also report that Chinese local governments consistently underestimate their revenue growth by a substantial margin, generating huge year-end slack, and that additional government spending funded by the slack strays completely free of legislative review and approval. They recommend a major budgetary reform to strengthen 8 the legal authority of the budget, as well as accountability in the public sector.
THE CASE OF CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LOCAL FISCAL SLACK
The literature has grown in the past several decades on the political economy of fiscal policy, particularly fiscal balance and debt accumulation, in both developed and developing countries. This study presents hypotheses concerning the factors that affect local fiscal slack based on two main lines of arguments presented in this literature. The first argument states that fiscal policy, meaning government fiscal slack in the context of this study, is determined by opportunistic policymakers whose choices are made with the intention of maximizing voter support. The second argument holds that fiscal and budgetary institutions matter to policymakers when making fiscal choices (Eslava 2006) . Given that China has yet fully to establish democratic mechanisms of popular elections and budgetary decision making, local government officials face distinctive incentives when formulating fiscal policies compared with their Western counterparts.
In comparison to those in democratic systems facing electoral incentives, in the Chinese governance structure, local officials are held accountable to performance criteria specified by officials from above. Therefore, based on the first argument, this study proposes hypotheses concerning the political incentives faced by local officials when making fiscal choices in the specific context of China. Moreover, in accordance with the second argument, it proposes hypotheses regarding the impact of fiscal incentives resulting from the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements on local officials' decisions on fiscal slack.
Attempting to explain China's rapid economic growth, scholars have noted the important role played by local officials in building infrastructure, promoting businesses, and attracting foreign investment. The "helping hand" (pro-business role) of Chinese local officials contrasts 9 sharply with the "grabbing hand" (rent-seeking behavior) of local officials in other transitional and developing countries (Krueger 1974; Frye and Shleifer 1997; Li and Zhou 2005) . Scholars have put forward two principal explanations for the different behaviors of Chinese local officials.
The first, known as "market-preserving federalism," suggests that fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal revenue-sharing contracts from 1980 to 1993 provided strong fiscal incentives for provincial officials to promote economic growth (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1996; Li and Zhou 2005) . The central government signed revenue-sharing contracts with provincial governments that essentially made the latter the residual claimants of the budgetary revenue. Jin, Qian, and Weingast (2005) confirm that the "fiscal contracts system" substantially strengthened the fiscal incentives of provincial governments, which generally contributed to provincial economic development. By comparing studies of federalism the Chinese style and federalism the Russian style, they find that the crucial difference concerns the fiscal incentives provided for local governments to pursue market-supporting activities.
Nevertheless, local officials in China continued to promote economic development even after the central government restructured central-provincial fiscal relations in its own favor with the 1994 and 2002 revenue-centralizing tax reforms (Tao et al. 2010; Su et al. 2012) . 6 This takes us to the second explanation that focuses on the effect of political incentives, or the career path, of local officials in China, in comparison to the focus of the first explanation on fiscal incentives . 7 According to this view, the personnel management reform that proceeded alongside the financial and tax reforms, but has long been overlooked in the literature, is equally important. After the 1980s' personnel reform, the central government used personnel control 10 measures to motivate local officials to pursue local economic growth; in other words, it promoted or demoted officials according to their performance in terms of GDP growth. Li and Zhou (2005) provide empirical evidence that the likelihood of the promotion (termination) of provincial leaders is positively (negatively) associated with provincial GDP growth. Chen, Li, and Zhou (2005) also find that the turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic performance relative to that of their immediate predecessors.
Rather than focusing on fiscal or political incentives alone, later studies reveal that both types of incentives have been influential in determining local officials' behaviors. Chinese local governments have focused on urbanization as a consequence of the recentralization of revenues by the central government in 1994 and 2002, which no longer made it profitable for them to continue to promote rural industrialization. To compensate for the lost local revenue resulting from the tax reforms, local governments have been assigned exclusive rights to the business tax that consists primarily of taxes levied upon the construction and real estate industries, as well as the service sector. The monopoly right assigned by the central government to local governments over the conversion of farmland to non-arable usages has also brought "windfall profits" to local governments, thanks to escalating land prices on the one hand and artificially low compensation to farmers on the other. Therefore, the revenues generated from the business tax and the farmland conversion process have provided local governments with powerful fiscal incentives to urbanize China. Since urbanization contributes to promoting local GDP growth, it also enhances the prospects of local officials' career advancement (Xu 2011; Kung, Xu, and Zhou 2013) .
In order to explain local officials' behaviors during China's reform and development, we 11 need to understand the fundamental differences between a federal state and the regionally decentralized authoritarian regime in China, which is characterized by a combination of political centralization and economic regional decentralization in its governance structure (Xu 2011).
China's political and economic institutions determine the incentive structures under which local officials operate. On the one hand, the governance of economic matters is mostly delegated to sub-national governments. Regional economies, including provinces, municipalities, and counties, are relatively self-contained, and sub-national governments are assigned the power to initiate and coordinate reforms, provide public services, and make and enforce laws within their jurisdictions. This feature makes the Chinese economy qualitatively different from a typical centrally planned economy. On the other hand, the highly centralized Chinese political and personnel governance structure fundamentally distinguishes the Chinese regime from fiscal federalism. Chinese local officials do not face pressure due to voice, exit, or election in a system of fiscal federalism. Instead, they face strong incentives to meet the career advancement criteria Within the growth-based promotion path, prefectural leaders as rational individuals might adjust local fiscal behavior in order to maximize their own political and personal benefits as "agents" of the "principal" of higher-level governments (Guo 2009; Rosen 1986 ), similar to the agency problems of municipal managers discussed in Gore (2009) 
H4: Expenditure decentralization in a province negatively affects local slack levels.
Similarly, sub-provincial revenue decentralization, or the share of sub-provincial revenue in total provincial and sub-provincial revenue, varies significantly across provinces. Tax reforms have been recommended to secure revenue adequacy and fiscal autonomy of local governments (Dabla-Norris 2005) . Greater revenue decentralization results in enhanced local revenue capacity.
Therefore, revenue decentralization is hypothesized to lead to higher slack levels.
H5: Revenue decentralization in a province positively affects local slack levels.
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MODEL, DATA, AND METHODS
Dependent Variables
This study develops two dependent variables to test the hypotheses proposed above. The first is the ratio of fiscal slack, or accumulated budget surplus over the years, to total budgetary revenue (including intergovernmental transfers). The second variable is per capita real fiscal slack in Chinese Renminbi (CNY). These two variables, in share and amount, respectively, capture the importance and volume of slack resources in each prefecture.
Independent Variables
The independent variables are comprised of major political and fiscal factors as well as control variables for prefectural features. To test H1 and H2, similar to Liang and Langbein (2015) and Li and Zhou (2005) , this analysis includes two political variables, namely a prefectural party secretary's distance to mandatory retirement and his or her tenure in that local political leadership position. The first fiscal variable included in the model is transfer dependency, measured as the share of transfers from higher-level governments in prefectural expenditure; this is to test H3. The model contains two decentralization measures, of expenditure and revenue, at the provincial level, to test H4 and H5. Expenditure decentralization is the share of sub-provincial outlays in the sum of provincial and sub-provincial outlays; revenue decentralization is the share of sub-provincial revenues in the sum of provincial and sub-provincial revenues.
We also include a number of socio-economic and demographic variables as controls in the model. The revenue ratio, calculated as the share of local revenue to GDP, indicates the revenue capacity of prefectural governments: those with higher revenue capacity would be expected to 16 have more fiscal slack. Per capita real GDP measures the local level of economic development: a prefecture with a higher level of economic development is more likely to accumulate more fiscal slack. Population is a control for the size of each jurisdiction. As urbanization provides powerful fiscal and political incentives for local government officials, urbanization level, which is measured as the percentage of the registered urban population (with urban hukou) in the total population, is included in the models as a control variable. 10 The ratios of secondary and tertiary industries are proxies for local economic and industrial structures. As indicated by previous research (for example, Hendrick (2006)), debt levels have a significant negative impact on fiscal slack. Unfortunately, the magnitude of local government indebtedness in China remains a puzzle due to the lack of reliable public data (He, Lin, and Tao 2014) . Table 1 provides the definitions and data sources of the variables used in this analysis and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables.
[ Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The mean value of per capita fiscal slack is CNY 289, 14 ranging from the lowest of negative CNY 214 to a very high value of CNY 3,864. The fiscal slack ratio averages 13 percent 17 in the sample period, ranging from -71 percent to 93 percent (see Table 2 ). The distribution of these two measures shows significant variation among prefectures by their respective levels of economic development. 
METHODOLOGY
To identify the determinants of local slack resource levels, this analysis estimates the following model:
where y, the dependent variable, is either the ratio or amount of local fiscal slack; x is a matrix of explanatory variables; α is prefecture-fixed effects; represents year-fixed effects; and is the random error term. Diagnostic statistics show the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the model; prefecture-clustered standard errors are therefor used to control for heteroskedasticity and intra-prefecture error correlation.
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Because local financial management involves activities and interactions that span multiple levels of the government hierarchy, dual-level modeling is employed for this empirical analysis. The first level is prefecture and the second level is province. Since prefectures are nested within provinces, prefectures in one province are more similar to one another than to those in other provinces. A multilevel random coefficient model is estimated, enabling the simultaneous examination of relationships at the prefecture level and relationships between prefectures and provinces (and the center). This approach models residuals at both the prefectural and the provincial levels, and thus it formally adjusts for the nonindependence of prefectures in the same province (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) . Without modeling such nonindependence, the standard errors of the estimates may be biased downward, which, in turn, may result in misleading conclusions about the impact of the variables in the model (Selden and Sowa 2004; Snijders and Bosker 1999) . Table 3 reports the regression results of three models with the share of fiscal slack in total revenue as the dependent variable. The first two models are estimated with both prefecture-and year-fixed effects; the second and third models control for province-level revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization. Looking at the coefficient estimates from Model 2, as expected, the party secretary's distance to mandatory retirement has a negative coefficient and this is significant at the 5 percent level, which suggests that younger local top leaders may be motivated to increase expenditures for government-funded projects in order to accelerate local development. This is an important measure in the local cadre's performance evaluation, which, in turn, results in a lower level of slack resources. The party secretary's length 19 of time in the current office is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus, H1 is supported by the empirical analysis, but H2 is not.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Transfer dependency is statistically significant at the 1 percent level; a one percentage point increase in transfer dependency drives up the share of slack resources by 0.39 percentage points. This empirical result provides strong support for H3. With regard to the two province-level fiscal variables, expenditure decentralization is statistically significant at the 1 percent level; its negative coefficient suggests that the higher expenditure responsibilities of prefectural cities lead to a lower share of fiscal slack. The coefficient on revenue decentralization is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the empirical results support H4
for expenditure decentralization, although not H5 for revenue decentralization.
As expected, the revenue ratio is highly significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable, indicating that a stronger revenue capacity of prefectural cities may contribute to a higher share of fiscal slack. The coefficient for population is statistically significant at the 1 percent level: a larger population size is associated with a higher slack ratio; no scale economy is observed here. 16 The urbanization level is not statistically significant;
however, other measures that can better capture prefectural urbanization activities need to be explored in future research. The other control variables in the model are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
For the multilevel analysis, following previous studies (for example, Heinrich 2002), the intra-class correlation coefficient is calculated based on an unconditional model, which does not include any covariates in the prefecture-level or province-level sub-models. The result indicates 20 that 26.7 percent of variation in the dependent variable is attributable to the province-level random intercept, and that the variation is substantive and statistically significant.
The results from the multilevel random coefficient model (Model 3) are consistent with those from the first two models. The coefficients with regard to the party secretary's distance to retirement, transfer dependency, expenditure decentralization, the revenue ratio, and population are statistically significant and have the same signs as those from Models 1 and 2. In addition, GDP, the secondary industry ratio, and the tertiary industry ratio are also highly significant with a positive sign, indicating the positive relationship of these three variables to slack resources.
[ Table 3 about here]
Then the dependent variable of real per capita fiscal slack is used to estimate the same fixed effects and multilevel random coefficient models, with the results shown in Table 4 . The results are mostly consistent with those discussed in Table 3 . The party secretary's distance to retirement remains significant in the multilevel analysis, though it loses statistical significance in the fixed effects models. The party secretary's tenure has an expected negative sign and becomes significant at the 10 percent level in the multilevel model. Transfer dependency remains highly significant in all three models. Expenditure decentralization is significant at the 1 percent level in Model 2. Similarly, revenue decentralization has an expected positive sign and is highly significant in Model 2, which suggests that the higher revenue capacity of prefectural cities may contribute to higher slack resource levels. Budgetary revenue ratio and GDP are highly significant in all three models with the expected positive coefficients. In general, the results are robust to varying specifications in models with either of the two dependent variables.
[ Table 4 about here]
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CONCLUSION
By employing a panel dataset of a large number of prefectural governments in China for an extended period of time, this study has aimed to examine the effects of political and fiscal incentives on local government behavior concerning fiscal slack in China. It improves our understanding of the working mechanisms of institutions for financial administration in China, so that we can better explain local government officials' behaviors in reform and development.
Based on previous studies of the political economy of fiscal policy, this study formulated several hypotheses for empirical testing. It developed a model that comprises some major political, fiscal, and socio-economic factors to explain local governments' volume and share of fiscal slack in the total budget in the context of a distinctively Chinese political and administrative structure. The empirical results of the analysis indicate the importance of political incentives in local fiscal decisions. The personnel control system that holds local officials accountable to performance measures defined by officials from above may result in unintended consequences in local financial administration. This study also suggests that fiscal incentives resulting from intergovernmental fiscal arrangements influence local governments' decisions on fiscal slack.
The reliance on intergovernmental transfers and assignment of expenditure responsibilities may significantly affect local slack resource levels. The differences across provinces and interaction between provincial and local governments may have a substantial impact on local fiscal behavior.
Since its last major restructuring in 1994, China's flawed fiscal system has muddled through for over two decades. Now a major fiscal reform has been set in motion, and the arrangements to share revenue, spending responsibilities and borrowing authority between the center and localities are still under deliberation (Koch-Weser 2014) . This study suggests that will surely have a great impact on local actions that concern fiscal slack.
With the support of more detailed budget data, future studies need to get behind the year-end aggregate fiscal balance data and examine the dynamics of budget implementation within the fiscal year, the strategic considerations of revenue estimation by local officials, and the incentive mechanisms for local revenue and spending decisions. Further research in this area will shed additional insight into the ongoing reform of China's fiscal and budgetary systems and improve its capacity in budget control and implementation.
The results of this study are still preliminary due to data limitations. More exhaustive research, with better data, is necessary to help create effective fiscal rules for establishing an institutionalized fiscal reserve system for sub-national governments in China. This would greatly benefit the development of their countercyclical fiscal capacity and ensure the continuation of China's remarkable economic growth.
1 Local governments in China refer to all sub-national levels of government in this study.
2 In recent years, the international market and academic circles have kept a keen watch on Chinese governments' debts, particularly local government debts. The debt finance of Chinese local governments is completely devoid of fiscal transparency (Ma 2013) . Local governments had not been formally granted the authority to borrow until the recent revision of the Budget Law in 2014. Thus, local government debts have accumulated mainly in the form of contingent liabilities, which are operated off budget (Ma 2013) . By establishing local financing vehicles as off-budget entities, local governments have circumvented legal constraints and incurred considerable debts with explicit and implicit government guarantees and obligations for repayment if the capital projects were to fail. Due to the lack of reliable public data, it remains difficult to track local government indebtedness in China (He, Lin, and Tao 2014) . Most debt revenues of Chinese local governments have been used for long-term infrastructure investment rather than for operating purposes (Ma 2013) . 
